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The Public Trust Doctrine Adrift in Federal Waters:
Fishery Management in the Exclusive Economic Zone
off Alaska
Joshua B. Fortenbery†
The public trust doctrine’s concern for posterity necessitates an ecosystem-based approach to fisheries management to ensure that marine resources are left unimpaired for future generations. In Alaska,
managing fisheries according to trust principles is a constitutional
obligation, and in order to prevent the inconsistent management of
migratory species, the same trust principles must be applied in the
federal waters of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) off Alaska,
where fully half of the commercial fishing in the entire United States
takes place. The Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (MSA) currently governs fishing in the EEZ, and provides two means of incorporating the public trust doctrine into
EEZ fishery management: (1) through the statute’s national
standards, implemented by regional councils, which create
trust duties requiring that fisheries remain viable year after
year, and (2) through the delegation or deferral of management authority to states with strong public trust doctrines. The
National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) has delegated or
deferred management authority over several EEZ fisheries to
the State of Alaska; those fisheries are currently being managed according to Alaska state law, even though they are located in federal waters. NMFS has indicated that objectives
of the MSA are not inconsistent with Alaska’s state management strategy—including its constitutional public trust obligations. The public trust doctrine provides fishery managers
with a means of expanding the scope of conservation strategies within the framework of existing regulations, and allows
† Editor in Chief, Environmental Law, Lewis & Clark Law School; J.D. expected 2016. I would
like to thank Professor Michael C. Blumm and my colleagues in the Public Trust Seminar course that
inspired this article, as well as acknowledge the casebook that helped inform my understanding of the
public trust doctrine: Michael C. Blumm & Mary Christina Wood, The Public Trust Doctrine in
Environmental and Natural Resources Law (2013). I would also like to thank the student membership
of the Seattle Journal of Environmental Law for their thoughtful comments and hard work.
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environmental plaintiffs to challenge commercial fishing activity that violates trust obligations by failing to protect the
long-term health of both fisheries and marine ecosystems. All
that is left is for the relevant actors in fisheries management
to seize and apply the doctrine.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Although some resources in the United States are incontrovertibly
impressed with inherent public access rights, the public trust doctrine that
supports these usufructuary rights has uncertain contours.1 The public trust
doctrine essentially maintains that certain natural resources constitute the
corpus of a trust, which the state must manage for the benefit of both
present and future generations.2 The doctrine traditionally focused on
protecting public access to navigable waters for the purposes of fishing
and commerce,3 but it has evolved into a flexible theory of resource

1. See, e.g., Jan S. Stevens, The Public Trust: A Sovereign's Ancient Prerogative Becomes the
People's Environmental Right, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 195, 230-31 (1980) (explaining how “public
rights in and over the beds of navigable waters and tidelands are firmly established,” but that beyond
these areas the public has uncertain rights).
2. DAVID C. SLADE, PUTTING THE PUBLIC TRUST TO WORK 3 (1997).
3. Charles F. Wilkinson, The Headwaters of the Public Trust: Some Thoughts on the Source and
Scope of the Traditional Doctrine, 19 ENVTL. L. 425, 431-32 (1989).
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management, particularly over the last forty years.4 States have employed
the public trust doctrine to assert public access rights to beaches,5 to
impose use restrictions on water rights presumed to be vested,6 and to
implement wildlife management regimes.7 There is no unified public trust
doctrine, however; each state administers the public trust according to its
own legal traditions.8
Alaska has a particularly robust public trust doctrine, which derives
much of its authority from the “common use” clause of the Alaska
Constitution.9 The Alaska Supreme Court has explained that the “common
law principles incorporated in the common use clause impose upon the
state a trust duty to manage the fish, wildlife, and water resources of the
state for the benefit of all the people.”10 The framers of the Alaska
Constitution were likely influenced by the U.S. Supreme Court,11 which
had previously ruled that states exercise their power over wildlife “as a
trust for the benefit of the people.”12 In Alaska, responsibility for
managing natural resources according to trust principles includes an
obligation for the state to treat fisheries as a public resource.13
Although the Alaskan public trust doctrine ostensibly guarantees the
sustainable management of living resources within state waters, just three
4. See Carol M. Rose, Joseph Sax and the Idea of the Public Trust, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 351 (1998)
(attributing the expansion of the doctrine into other areas of natural resource management to an article
written by Professor Joseph Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law: Effective
Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH L. REV. 471 (1970)).
5. See Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355, 365 (N.J. 1894) (“the public
must be given access to and use of privately-owned dry sand areas as reasonably necessary”).
6. See Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 452 (1983) (holding that no party
can obtain a vested right to harm the public trust, and that trust principles must be considered in water
allocation decisions).
7. Barrett v. State, 116 N.E. 99, 102 (N.Y. 1917) (“In liberating these beaver the state was acting
as a government. As a trustee for the people . . . it was doing what it thought best for the interests of
the public at large”).
8. SLADE, supra note 2, at 3.
9. ALASKA CONST. art. VIII, § 3 (“Wherever occurring in their natural state, fish, wildlife, and
waters are reserved to the people for common use.”); See also Gregory F. Cook, The Public Trust
Doctrine in Alaska, 8 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 1, 21 (1993) (“In Alaska, the scope of the resources
covered by the umbrella of the public trust doctrine is far broader than in most other states”).
10. Owsichek v. Alaska, 763 P.2d 488, 495 (Alaska 1988).
11. Id. (“The framers of the common use clause probably relied heavily on Geer [161 U.S.
519].”).
12. Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 530 (1896).
13. See Gilbert v. State, Dep't of Fish & Game, Bd. of Fisheries, 803 P.2d 391, 398-99 (Alaska
1990). (“The state has an obligation to manage fish and game resources to the benefit of all in accord
with its public trust duties”); Metlakatla Indian Cmty., Annette Island Reserve v. Egan, 362 P.2d 901,
915 (Alaska 1961) (subsequent history omitted) (“These migrating schools of fish, while in inland
waters, are the property of the state, held in trust for the benefit of all the people of the state, and the
obligation and authority to equitably and wisely regulate the harvest is that of the state”).
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miles offshore, in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ), it remains unclear
whether there is any baseline protection of fishery resources.14 Because
half of all commercial fishing in the United States takes place in the EEZ
off Alaska,15 these federally managed fisheries have the potential to
greatly affect the health of migratory species in Alaskan waters. The
Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (MSA)
currently governs fishing in the EEZ,16 and delegates authority for
managing the waters off the Alaskan coast to the North Pacific Fishery
Management Council (NPFMC), one of eight regional fishery
management councils.17 If there is no corollary to the public trust doctrine
in the EEZ, the NPFMC presumably would be free to set fishery
management policy without considering potential harm to future
generations, thereby undermining Alaskan public trust principles and the
state’s fiduciary obligations.
It is possible that the management of natural resources as trustee for
the public is an inherent attribute of sovereignty, as one commentator
argues.18 If that is true, then public trust principles would necessarily
constrain any federal actions in the EEZ, as the U.S. is the only sovereign
entity with jurisdiction over the fishery resources in those waters.19 This
argument poses an interesting theoretical question, but overlooks two
crucial ways in which the public trust doctrine is already relevant to fishery
management in the EEZ. First, Congress incorporated public trust duties
into the MSA’s national standards,20 and fishery management councils
must consider these trust obligations in formulating all fishery

14. Mary Turnipseed et al., The Silver Anniversary of the United States' Exclusive Economic
Zone: Twenty-Five Years of Ocean Use and Abuse, and the Possibility of A Blue Water Public Trust
Doctrine, 36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 8 (2009). Although the EEZ technically begins 12 miles offshore, under
U.S. fisheries laws, the EEZ is defined as the waters between three and two hundred nautical miles
from the coast., What is the EEZ?, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN.,
http://oceanservice.noaa.gov/facts/eez.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2015).
15. Molly Dischner, NOAA: Alaska Fish Worth $1.7B in 2012, ALASKA JOURNAL OF COMMERCE
(May
8,
2014),
http://www.alaskajournal.com/Alaska-Journal-of-Commerce/May-Issue-22014/NOAA-Alaska-fish-worth-17B-in-2012/.
16. Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1883
(2012).
17. 16 U.S.C. § 1852(a)(1)(G) (2012).
18. See Casey Jarman, The Public Trust in the Exclusive Economic Zone, 65 OR. L. REV. 1, 2
(1986) (arguing that the claim of sovereignty over the EEZ necessarily extended the public trust
doctrine to federal resource management in those waters).
19. Id. at 1–2.
20. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(1) (National Standard 1 requires fisheries to achieve optimum
yield “on a continuing basis,” consistent with the public trust doctrine’s goal of preserving resources
for future generations).
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management plans.21 Second, fishery management councils can delegate
or defer management authority to the states under certain conditions,22 and
if a state has a strong public trust doctrine applicable to fishing, that state’s
trust duties will be extended to any EEZ fisheries under its jurisdiction.23
For example, the NPFMC has deferred much of its authority to
regulate salmon fishing in federal waters to the State of Alaska, and state
regulations govern commercial salmon fishing in designated portions of
the EEZ with no federal oversight.24 State management of these salmon
fisheries raises interesting questions of federalism because Alaska state
law—rather than the MSA—now applies in parts of the EEZ, even though
the federal government has claimed exclusive sovereign authority over the
entire EEZ. If there are no public trust duties impressed upon the portions
of the EEZ managed by Alaska, this management scheme would create
inconsistent obligations for the state, as it would have to consider trust
principles within state waters, then abandon those considerations with
respect to the exact same species of fish in federal waters. Such a result
would be untenable, and contrary to the NPFMC’s stated goal of managing
“salmon stocks seamlessly throughout their range.”25 Therefore, it is likely
that Alaska manages salmon fishing in the EEZ according to its longstanding role as trustee over the living resources under its jurisdiction. If
Alaska is already applying trust principles in an EEZ fishery, arguably the
objectives of the MSA are at least consistent with the public trust doctrine.
However, the public trust doctrine requires protection of the entire marine
ecosystem,26 while the MSA is mostly concerned with sustaining viable
populations of commercially valuable species.27 The public trust doctrine
thus encourages stricter fishery management than the MSA, ensuring that
future generations will have unimpaired access not only to fisheries, but
to all ocean resources potentially affected by fishing.
21. Id. at § 1851 (“Any fishery management plan prepared, and any regulation promulgated to
implement any such plan, pursuant to this subchapter shall be consistent with the following national
standards for fishery conservation and management”).
22. Id. at § 1856 (describing state jurisdiction under the MSA).
23. Id. § 1856(a)(3) (describing when state laws and regulations apply in the EEZ, extending
applicable state public trust doctrines into federal waters).
24. NPFMC, FISHERY MANAGEMENT PLAN FOR THE SALMON FISHERIES IN THE EEZ OFF
ALASKA 16 (2012) (“[S]tate regulations apply to all fishing vessels participating in these fisheries . . .
”) [hereinafter Salmon FMP].
25. Id. at 12.
26. See Ralph W. Johnson, Oil and the Public Trust Doctrine in Washington, 14 U. PUGET
SOUND L. REV. 671, 678 n. 50 (1991) (“the right of fishery necessarily includes an implied right to
water quality sufficient to support the fishery.”).
27. See 16 U.S.C. 1801(b) (detailing the purposes of the MSA, which only discuss conservation
in the context of commercial and recreational fisheries).
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As stated above,28 the MSA provides two means of incorporating the
public trust doctrine into EEZ fishery management: (1) through national
standards applicable to all management decisions,29 and (2) through the
delegation of management authority to states with strong public trust
doctrines.30 Accordingly, fishery management councils should be more
willing to consider public trust principles in formulating fishery
management plans, injecting long-term environmental considerations into
fishery management decisions currently dominated by the immediate
interests of the commercial fishing industry.31 Environmental plaintiffs
should also be prepared to challenge fishery management decisions that
violate the public trust doctrine, rather than relying exclusively on the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) to bring suit.32 Although the MSA
prescribes the standard of judicial review for challenges to regulations
made under the Act,33 the MSA does not preempt the public trust doctrine,
as several courts have found that the doctrine is not displaced by
legislation, but rather supplements statutes governing resource use.34 The
public trust doctrine thus provides fishery managers with a means of
expanding the scope of conservation strategies within the framework of
existing regulations and allows environmental plaintiffs to challenge

28. See supra notes 20–22.
29. 16 U.S.C. § 1851.
30. Id. at § 1856.
31. See, e.g., Peter Van Tuyn, Courage Without Conviction: Cause for Chaos in U.S. Marine
Fisheries Management, 28 VT. L. REV. 663, 666 (2004) (arguing that management measures without
economic benefits are given little attention because “industry-dominated ‘regional fishery
management councils’ are empowered to craft regulations for their own industry”).
32. Section 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act provides that a “reviewing court shall
compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed,” and “hold unlawful and set aside
agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be: (A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion,
or otherwise not in accordance with law; (B) contrary to constitutional right; (C) in excess of statutory
jurisdiction; (D) without observance of procedure required by law; (E) unsupported by substantial
evidence;” or “(F) unwarranted by the facts.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2012). Under the MSA, a “court shall
only set aside any such regulation or action on a ground specified in section 706(2)(A), (B), (C), or
(D) of such Title.” 16 U.S.C. § 1855(f)(1)(B) (2012). Invoking the public trust doctrine would provide
plaintiffs with a more flexible means of challenging agency action, as complaints would not be limited
to whether agency interpretations of the MSA are reasonable and the agency would not be given so
much deference. Turnipseed et al., supra note 14, at 58.
33. 16 U.S.C. § 1855(f)(1)(B).
34. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Dep't of Interior, 398 F. Supp. 284, 287 (N.D. Cal. 1975) (finding
the National Park Service Organic Act to impose affirmative public trust duties beyond the plain
language of the statute); Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 445 (1988) (holding
that the public trust doctrine must be considered in conjunction with the statutory appropriative water
rights system); In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 445 (Haw. 2000) (“The Code and its
implementing agency, the Commission, do not override the public trust doctrine or render it
superfluous.”).
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commercial fishing activity that violates trust obligations by failing to
protect the long-term health of both fisheries and marine ecosystems.
This article maintains that any assertion of sovereignty over
migratory fish in the EEZ off Alaska is necessarily limited by the public
trust doctrine, as unfettered management of those resources would
undermine the Alaskan public trust doctrine and threaten depletion of the
trust corpus. Part II explores the nature of Alaska’s public trust doctrine.
Part III considers whether there is a common law federal public trust
doctrine applicable to EEZ fisheries. Part IV analyzes the statutory
management scheme of the MSA and the public trust principles that
Congress imputed into the MSA’s national standards. Part V discusses the
delegation of authority to states under the MSA, and asserts that the
objectives of the MSA must be consistent with Alaska’s public trust
doctrine because the state is applying its trust principles to the
management of several fisheries in the EEZ off Alaska. The article
concludes that the NPFMC and environmental plaintiffs should be willing
to use the public trust doctrine as a means of encouraging fishery
management practices that will benefit both present and future
generations, as required by the public trust doctrine and the Alaska
Constitution.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE ALASKA PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
Many scholars have already traced the international and domestic
origins of the public trust doctrine, so this article will not attempt a
redundant history lesson.35 The Alaskan public trust doctrine, although
distinct from that of other states, contains many principles that were
imported from other jurisdictions.36 Even so, Alaska’s public trust doctrine
reflects a unique set of concerns. Alaska is a vast territory with an immense
amount of valuable natural resources, and the state’s constitution contains
several provisions aimed at protecting those resources, entrenching the
Alaskan public trust doctrine as foundational law.37
Perhaps the most important public trust provision in the Alaska
Constitution is the “common use clause,” providing that “wherever
occurring in their natural state, fish, wildlife, and waters are reserved to

35. See, e.g., Wilkinson, supra note 3 (explaining the international origins of the public trust
doctrine and its establishment in the U.S.); Sax, supra note 4, at 475–76 (describing the influence of
Roman and English law on the public trust doctrine in the U.S.).
36. See CWC Fisheries, Inc. v. Bunker, 755 P.2d 1115, 1118 (Alaska 1988) (adopting the
“approach employed by [Alaska’s] sister states” in attaching trust obligations to state conveyances of
tidelands).
37. Cook, supra note 9, at 5.
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the people for common use.”38 Although the common use clause does not
explicitly mention the public trust doctrine, the Alaska Supreme Court has
explained that this provision constitutionalized “common law principles
imposing upon the state a public trust duty with regard to the management
of fish, wildlife and waters.”39 In the context of managing living resources,
this duty is both a “prohibition against any monopolistic grants or special
privileges”40 and, with reference to fish, an obligation to “equitably and
wisely” regulate harvests.41 Importantly, private citizens can invoke the
Alaskan public trust doctrine to challenge state regulations, and the Alaska
Supreme Court has stated that it will subject any regulations granting
exclusive privileges over resources listed in the common use clause to
close scrutiny.42
The Alaska Supreme Court’s interpretations of the Alaskan public
trust doctrine reflect the doctrine’s emphasis on equal access to resources,
and in fact, the state adopted the “common use” provisions of its
constitution mostly as an anti-monopoly measure.43 However,
guaranteeing equitable harvesting rights is not the only obligation of the
state. The doctrine also requires state officials to prevent depletion of the
trust corpus by providing for the conservation of fish and game
resources.44 Obviously, guaranteeing equal access to a resource that the
public could exploit into oblivion would be a meaningless exercise, and it
is this additional duty to provide for the conservation of living resources
that is most relevant in the fisheries context. The state’s obligation to
conserve fishery resources is reinforced by the “no exclusive right of
fishery” clause of the Alaska Constitution.45 Originally, this clause only
38. ALASKA CONST., art. VIII, § 3.
39. Owsichek v. State, Guide Licensing & Control Bd., 763 P.2d 488, 493 (Alaska 1988).
40. Id. at 496.
41. Metlakatla Indian Cmty., Annette Island Reserve v. Egan, 362 P.2d 901, 915 (Alaska 1961)
(subsequent history omitted).
42. Owsichek, 763 P.2d at 494 (“grants of exclusive rights to harvest natural resources listed in
the common use clause should be subjected to close scrutiny.”).
43. Id. at 493 (“We begin by examining constitutional history to determine the framers' intent in
enacting the common use clause . . . Its purpose was anti-monopoly. This purpose was achieved by
constitutionalizing common law principles imposing upon the state a public trust duty with regard to
the management of fish, wildlife and waters.”).
44. Herscher v. State, Dep't of Commerce, 568 P.2d 996, 1005 (Alaska 1977) (“fish and game
resources are permitted to be harvested, but at the same time must be conserved to avoid depletion and
extinction”).
45. ALASKA CONST. art. VIII, § 15 (“No exclusive right or special privilege of fishery shall be
created or authorized in the natural waters of the State. This section does not restrict the power of the
State to limit entry into any fishery for purposes of resource conservation, to prevent economic distress
among fishermen and those dependent upon them for a livelihood and to promote the efficient
development of aquaculture in the State”).
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required the state to equitably allocate fishing privileges, but the
constitution was later amended to clarify that the state can “limit entry into
any fishery for purposes of resource conservation.”46 Essentially, the “no
exclusive right of fishery” clause delineates the state’s fishery
management objectives— although Alaska cannot grant any fishing vessel
exclusive harvest rights, the state can restrict access to fisheries if
necessary to ensure their continued vitality, consistent with its duties as
trustee over fishery resources.47 Because trust principles are fundamental
to Alaska’s fishery management decisions, state participation in the
management of federal fisheries must involve the same considerations
described above.48 The next section considers whether there is a common
law federal public trust doctrine in the EEZ analogous to that of Alaska.
III. A COMMON LAW FEDERAL PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IN THE EEZ
President Ronald Reagan declared U.S. sovereignty over the world’s
largest EEZ in a 1983 presidential proclamation,49 and arguments that this
assertion of sovereignty created public trust duties in the EEZ followed
shortly thereafter.50 One scholar argued that “the EEZ notion of sovereign
rights brings with it . . . an increased role of public or common
stewardship.”51 Despite many persuasive arguments regarding why the
public trust doctrine should apply in the EEZ, commentators still have not
reached any consensus as to whether the doctrine does apply to ocean
resources.52 If a public trust already exists in the EEZ, a private plaintiff
46. Stephen M. White, "Equal Access" to Alaska's Fish and Wildlife, 11 ALASKA L. REV. 277,
285 (1994) (ALASKA CONST. art. VIII, § 15).
47. Id.; The Alaska Constitution’s “sustained yield” clause stresses that the state’s fisheries are
to be sustainably managed, and describes fish as a “replenishable” resource. ALASKA CONST., art.
VIII, § 4.
48. Part V examines the implications of Alaska managing federal fisheries according to the
state’s trust principles.
49. Proclamation No. 5030, Exclusive Economic Zone of the United States of America, 48 Fed.
Reg. 10605, codified at 3 C.F.R. § 5030 (Mar. 10, 1985).
50. See Jarman, supra note 18, at 1–2 (arguing that trust principles should apply to the EEZ just
three years after the declaration of sovereignty over those waters).
51. Biliana Cicin-Sain & Robert W. Knecht, The Problem of Governance of U.S. Ocean
Resources and the New Exclusive Economic Zone, 15 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 289, 307 (1985).
52. See, e.g., Turnipseed et al., supra note 14, at 25 (recent article discussing the “unresolved
possibility of a public trust doctrine for federal ocean waters”); Kevin J. Lynch, Application of the
Public Trust Doctrine to Modern Fishery Management Regimes, 15 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 285, 288
(2007) (“it is not clear that the [public trust] doctrine would apply as a matter of law to many federallycontrolled marine fisheries”). It is possible that the continued ambiguity in the scholarship is due to a
focus on whether public trust principles and the historical foundations of the public trust doctrine are
theoretically consistent with sovereign management of ocean resources. See, e.g., DONALD C. BAUR
ET AL., OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW AND POLICY 58 (2008) (“Looking back to its origins, there are
sound reasons for applying the Public Trust Doctrine in the federal EEZ”).
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could invoke the public trust doctrine to challenge federal fishery
management decisions that fail to protect the fishing rights of future
generations.53 In addition, fishery management councils currently tend to
focus on conserving species that have commercial value—when councils
prioritize conservation at all—because industry representatives dominate
the council system.54 A public trust doctrine generally applicable to the
EEZ would require fishery managers to consider the effects of fishing on
the marine ecosystem as a whole, authorizing environmental claims
alleging damage to trust resources without necessarily tying those claims
to the objectives of the MSA.
Regardless of whether EEZ fisheries are similar to other resources
subject to the public trust doctrine, any claim that the federal government
is burdened by trust responsibilities in the EEZ must find support in federal
law to make that burden enforceable. This section considers evidence that
the public trust doctrine applies to the federal government as a matter of
common law. Part IV proceeds to argue that the MSA imposes statutory
trust duties on fishery management in the EEZ.
There are at least two federal district court decisions that directly bear
on the issue of federal public trust obligations. In U.S. v. 1.58 Acres of
Land, the federal district court for the District of Massachusetts considered
whether the federal condemnation of a state’s submerged lands destroyed
the public trust impressed on that property.55 Adopting a theory of cotrusteeship, the court held that the public trust at issue was administered
jointly by the state and federal governments, such that “neither sovereign
may alienate [the] land free and clear of the public trust.”56 One scholar
has asserted that the federal government assumes this role of co-trustee
any time there is a national interest in a resource under state jurisdiction,
and that co-trustee obligations are an inherent attribute of the U.S.
federalist system, with its “layered sovereign interests in natural

53. See Sierra Club v. Dep't of Interior, 398 F. Supp. 284 (N.D. Cal. 1975) (attributing a public
trust doctrine to the administration of the national parks for the first time in the context of litigation).
54. See, e.g., Van Tuyn, supra note 31, at 666 (“North Pacific fishery managers . . . have rejected
habitat protections where the benefit of doing so cannot be expressed in direct economic terms; and
they have done this despite the ever-increasing body of scientific information detailing the long-term
destructive nature of trawling on marine habitats.”). If fishery managers considered their role to be
that of a trustee over living resources, rather than mere facilitators of commercial fishing, perhaps with
encouragement from environmental plaintiffs, it might be possible to shift the focus from the economic
costs of habitat protection to the conservation benefits of habitat protection.
55. U.S. v. 1.58 Acres of Land, 523 F. Supp. 120 (D. Mass. 1981).
56. Id. at 124.
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resources.”57 This argument is based on the property law concept of cotenancy, which posits that co-tenant fiduciary duties are created whenever
two entities are equally entitled to common property.58 The concept of cotenancy has less certain application in the context of the EEZ, however, as
even though coastal states and the federal government might have a
common interest in migratory fish, only the federal government has
claimed sovereign rights over EEZ fisheries.59 Thus, the resources in those
fisheries are not obviously a common asset.
An alternative to co-trusteeship is the possibility that the federal
government has an independent obligation to protect wildlife resources for
the benefit of the U.S. public, separate from any co-tenant duty to protect
a state’s trust property. After a transportation company allegedly destroyed
thirty thousand waterfowl as a result of an oil spill, the federal district court
for the Eastern District of Virginia stated that the federal government’s
right to seek damages did not depend on ownership of the migratory
birds.60 Instead, in In re Steuart Transp. Co., the court held that “[u]nder
the public trust doctrine, the State of Virginia and the United States have
the right and the duty to protect and preserve the public's interest in natural
wildlife resources,” and therefore the public trust doctrine supported the
U.S. claim for damages.61 This language seemingly provides strong
support for the premise that the federal government has a trust duty to
manage living resources for the benefit of the public.
Cutting against the strength of the Steuart holding, however, is dicta
asserting that “no individual citizen could seek recovery for the
waterfowl.”62 This statement may indicate that an environmental plaintiff
would not be able to sue a third party for damaging federal trust property.
Although the court stated that the U.S. has an obligation to “protect and
preserve” natural resources, damage or threatened damage to those
resources apparently only creates a right of action in the federal
government against third parties.63 Such a construction of the public trust
doctrine might not allow private citizens or state governments to hold the

57. Mary Christina Wood, Advancing the Sovereign Trust of Government to Safeguard the
Environment for Present and Future Generations (Part I): Ecological Realism and the Need for A
Paradigm Shift, 39 ENVTL. L. 43, 85 (2009).
58. Id. at 86.
59. 16 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(1) (2012) (The U.S. will exercise “sovereign rights for the purposes of
exploring, exploiting, conserving, and managing all fish, within the exclusive economic zone
established by Presidential Proclamation 5030”).
60. In re Steuart Transp. Co., 495 F. Supp. 38, 39 (E.D. Va. 1980).
61. Id. at 40.
62. Id.
63. Id.
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U.S. accountable as a trustee for any damage to the trust corpus. The
Steuart court invoked the doctrine only to permit the U.S. to pursue
damages; it did not indicate whether the “right and duty” to protect wildlife
involved an affirmative obligation enforceable against the federal
government.64 If not, the federal public trust doctrine would exist only to
the extent that the U.S. government chooses to apply it in its prosecutorial
discretion. Thus, even if this public trust duty applies to the fishery
resources in the EEZ, it still might not serve as a check on unwise federal
management because it would be unavailable to private plaintiffs. In all,
the instances in which courts have recognized federal public trust duties
lend uncertain support to the notion of a workable public trust doctrine for
EEZ fisheries. Therefore, if there are any enforceable federal trust
obligations in the EEZ, those obligations must have legislative origins.
The next section examines whether Congress imputed public trust duties
into the MSA.
IV. FISHERY MANAGEMENT UNDER THE MAGNUSON-STEVENS FISHERY
CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT ACT
Although the public trust doctrine’s origins largely lie in the common
law, legislatures have also enacted laws reflecting trust principles,66 and
many modern courts have recognized congressional intent to incorporate
the public trust doctrine into various statutes.67 Thus, even though EEZ
fisheries are already highly regulated under the MSA,68 the existence of a
statutory management regime in the EEZ does not foreclose the
application of the public trust doctrine in those federal waters, as courts
have long recognized that the public trust doctrine complements, rather
65

64. See id. .
65. See Turnipseed et al., supra note 14, at 47 (“The public trust doctrine has customarily been
a matter of common law.”).
66. See Alexandra B. Klass, Modern Public Trust Principles: Recognizing Rights and
Integrating Standards, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 699, 720 (2006) (asserting that the “National
Environmental Policy Act, the Clean Water Act, and the Endangered Species Act, are based on public
trust principles in the sense that they set out a policy of protecting and preserving the environment for
its own sake and for future generations.”).
67. See, e.g., Esplanade Properties, LLC v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 978, 986 (9th Cir. 2002)
(stating that the public trust doctrine is reflected in Washington’s Shoreline Management Act); Sierra
Club v. Dep't of Interior, 398 F. Supp. 284, 287 (N.D. Cal. 1975) (finding the National Park Service
Organic Act to impose trust duties on the Secretary of the Interior); See also Klass, supra note 66, at
734 (“courts are relying on the common law doctrine but infusing it with policies and standards
contained in more contemporary environmental legislation or state constitutional provisions”).
68. See 16 U.S.C. § 1811 (2012) (asserting exclusive fishery management authority over the
EEZ).
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than supplants, statutes governing resource use.69 This section first
discusses the structure and administration of the MSA, then examines the
statute for evidence of affirmative public trust obligations.
A. The Basic Structure of the MSA
Congress enacted the MSA to “conserve and manage the fishery
resources found off the coasts of the United States . . . by exercising
sovereign rights for the purposes of exploring, exploiting, conserving, and
managing all fish, within the exclusive economic zone.”70 The statute
essentially divided the EEZ into discrete geographic regions and assigned
management authority to eight regional fishery management councils.71
Fishery management councils, largely comprised of state officials and
industry representatives, must prepare a fishery management plan “for
each fishery under its authority that requires conservation and
management.”72 The councils have a considerable amount of discretion in
formulating a fishery management plan (FMP), so long as it is consistent
with the provisions of the MSA, including the ten “national standards.”73
These standards reflect the basic policy objectives of the statute, such as
achieving the “optimum yield” of each fishery on a continuing basis,
avoiding discrimination between residents of different states, and
considering the importance of fishery resources to fishing communities in
order to provide for their sustained participation in a fishery.74 The FMPs
developed by the regional councils, rather than the MSA itself, govern the
specific management measures of each fishery, so in order to maintain
federal oversight the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) reviews
each FMP for consistency with federal law.75 The MSA thus creates a
national program of conservation and management, while promoting
region-specific management measures.76
Despite an equal emphasis on both fishing and conservation from the
MSA’s enactment in 1976, overfishing has been a constant problem,77 and
69. See, e.g., In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 445 (Haw. 2000) (“The Code and
its implementing agency, the Commission, do not override the public trust doctrine or render it
superfluous.”); Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 726-727 (1988) (rejecting the
assertion that the California appropriative water rights system subsumed the public trust doctrine).
70. 16 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(1) (2012).
71. Id. § 1852(a)(1).
72. Id. § 1852(h)(1).
73. Id. § 1851.
74. Id.
75. Eric Schwaab, The Magnuson Act Thirty-Five Years Later, 17 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV.
14, 15 (2012).
76. Id.
77. See Van Tuyn, supra note 31, at 663.
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multiple amendments to the statute have addressed the failure to achieve
sustainable fisheries.78 The most recent changes to the MSA, adopted in
2007, required the regional management councils to set annual catch limits
and included accountability measures designed to eliminate overfishing.79
Although one National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA) administrator described the amendments as “groundbreaking”
and expressed optimism about the prospects for successfully ending
overfishing,80 others are more skeptical.81 This skepticism seems to be
based on an impression that the fragmented, regional, and regulatory
nature of ocean governance is inherently unworkable and has prevented
any meaningful progress in conserving ocean resources.82
Although a unified marine conservation strategy divorced from the
MSA might be useful, the argument that conservation goals cannot
otherwise be achieved ignores the benefits of fragmented management for
certain EEZ fisheries. For example, fishery managers in New England
refused to limit entry into the fisheries under their jurisdiction or set hard
catch limits for years, decisions that arguably led to the collapse of the
region’s fisheries.83 In contrast, fisheries in the North Pacific have
remained relatively healthy, in part due to a fragmented management
approach that allowed the Alaska region to set strict catch limits, while
New England was encouraging unlimited participation.84 Had the New
England fishery managers dominated national policy, in all likelihood
every U.S. fishery would currently be on the brink of collapse, so it is
important to remember that a unified management regime could be as
harmful as it could be beneficial, depending on who is in charge. Further,
as described below, fishery management councils can delegate
management authority to the states under certain circumstances,85 and this
delegation of authority can result in fishery management that emphasizes
conservation and sustainability beyond the requirements of the MSA,
78. See Turnipseed et al., supra note 14, at 54-55.
79. Shaun M. Gehan & Michele Hallowell, Battle to Determine the Meaning of the MagnusonStevens Fisheries Conservation and Management Reauthorization Act of 2006: A Survey of Recent
Judicial Decisions, 18 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 1, 7 (2012).
80. Schwaab, supra note 75, at 17.
81. Turnipseed et al., supra note 14, at 55 (“While this act provides a stronger mandate to manage
fisheries sustainably than the previous Sustainable Fisheries Act, not enough time has passed to judge
its effectiveness”).
82. Id. at 7.
83. PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS AND OCEAN CONSERVANCY, THE LAW THAT’S SAVING
AMERICAN FISHERIES: THE MAGNUSON-STEVENS FISHERY CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT ACT
10 (2013).
84. Id.
85. See infra Part V.A.
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particularly when an authorized state like Alaska has public trust duties in
fishery management decisions.86
B. Statutory Evidence of a Public Trust in the EEZ
One scholar has argued that the MSA did not go far enough in
incorporating public trust principles.87 By failing to impose a clear public
trust burden on fisheries management, this commentator claimed that
Congress “short-circuited the ability of courts to participate in ensuring
U.S. fisheries management was sustainable.”88 While it is true that there is
no explicit reference to the public trust doctrine in the MSA, it does not
necessarily follow that the statute imposes no trust obligations. In fact,
national standards 1, 4, and 8 all reflect public trust concerns. National
standards 1 and 8 of the MSA both include an obligation to protect the
usufructuary rights of future generations, an important public trust
principle.89 Consistent with this purpose, courts have ruled that “the
Service must give priority to conservation measures” when making
management decisions under the MSA, 90 as the statute contemplates that
commercial fishing will be a viable industry year after year.91 In addition,
national standard 4 emphasizes non-discrimination in the allocation of
fishing privileges, a reflection of the public trust doctrine’s historical
emphasis on equal access to resources.92 Although neither the national
standards nor the courts’ prioritization of conservation measures provide
any explicit reference to the public trust doctrine, it is clear that the
implementing agency does not have unfettered management discretion.
86. See infra Part V.B.
87. Turnipseed et al., supra note 14, at 56.
88. Id.
89. See 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(1) (2012) (“Conservation and management measures shall prevent
overfishing while achieving, on a continuing basis, the optimum yield from each fishery for the United
States fishing industry”) (emphasis added); 16 U.S.C.A. § 1851(a)(8) (2012) (“Conservation and
management measures shall . . . take into account the importance of fishery resources to fishing
communities . . . in order to . . . provide for the sustained participation of such communities”).
90. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Daley, 209 F.3d 747, 753 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (holding that
fishery quotas which did not have at least a 50% chance of meeting the MSA’s conservation goals
were unreasonable).
91. 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(1) (2012).
92. Id. § 1851(a)(4) (National standard 4 provides that “[c]onservation and management
measures shall not discriminate between residents of different States. If it becomes necessary to
allocate or assign fishing privileges among various United States fishermen, such allocation shall be
(A) fair and equitable to all such fishermen; (B) reasonably calculated to promote conservation; and
(C) carried out in such manner that no particular individual, corporation, or other entity acquires an
excessive share of such privileges.”); See also Lynch, supra note 46, at 297 (“[National standard 4] is
consistent with the decisions of state courts under the public trust doctrine that allow municipalities to
charge reasonable fees for the use of their beaches, but do not allow them to “discriminate in any
respect between their residents and nonresidents.”).
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Instead, fishery managers are supposed to achieve optimum yield in each
fishery “on a continuing basis,”93 rather than annually, and management
measures must provide for the “sustained participation” of fishing
communities.94
The MSA is not the only federal statute that contains public trust
principles. For example, the National Park Service Organic Act of 1916
contains language that suggests the imposition of trust duties.95 That Act
provides that the National Park Service:
shall promote and regulate the use of the Federal areas known as
national parks, monuments, and reservations . . . by such means and
measures as conform to the fundamental purpose of the said parks,
monuments, and reservations, which purpose is to conserve the scenery and the natural and historic objects and the wild life therein and
to provide for the enjoyment of the same in such manner and by
such means as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future
generations.96

When the Sierra Club challenged National Park Service failures to
mitigate the potential harm of logging activity adjacent to Redwood
National Park, the federal district court for the Northern District of
California held that the National Park Service Organic Act imposed public
trust duties on the National Park Service, by requiring that park resources
remain “unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations.”97
Essentially, the statute’s concern for posterity led the court to find “a
general trust duty imposed upon the National Park Service . . . to conserve
scenery and natural and historic objects and wildlife,” despite the absence
of any specific statutory reference to the public trust doctrine.98 This
statutory trust duty, reasoned the court, obligated the Secretary of the
Interior to take reasonable steps to protect Redwood National Park from
the effects of logging by upland property owners. 99 Although the threats
to the park were largely external, and the actions necessary to ensure
adequate protection of park resources required additional funding, the
court ordered the Secretary of the Interior to exhaust all possibilities of
negotiating favorable agreements with upland property owners, and to

93. 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(1) (2012).
94. Id. § 1851(a)(8).
95. 16 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
96. Id.
97. Sierra Club v. Dep't of Interior, 398 F. Supp. 284, 287 (N.D. Cal. 1975) (subsequent history
omitted) [hereinafter Redwood National Park case].
98. Id.
99. Id. at 288.
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request funds from Congress, if necessary.100 The recognition of the public
trust doctrine was thus the recognition of an obligation beyond the plain
language of a statute, as the court determined that the Secretary had an
affirmative duty to protect the public trust and ensure that resources would
be left “unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations.”101
The Redwood National Park case indicates that a court can interpret
congressional intent to impose trust principles even in the absence of
specific statutory references to the public trust doctrine, because statutory
management regimes complement the public trust doctrine rather than
replace it.102 It follows that the trust language in the MSA— requiring
resources to remain available for use by future generations, much like the
National Park Service Organic Act— creates public trust duties in the
management of the EEZ.103 There may not be an explicit reference to the
public trust doctrine in the MSA, but there is an implicit endorsement, as
the national standards clearly require fishery management councils to
achieve optimum yield “on a continuing basis.”104 This statutory mandate
indicates that a fishery cannot be exploited in a manner which would deny
posterity access to the resource, just as the National Park Service must
ensure that future generations have unimpaired access to the resources in
Redwood National Park.
In addition to requiring the sustained viability of commercial
fisheries, the MSA also includes provisions aimed at preserving the longterm health of the ecosystems that support those fisheries. For example,
the MSA’s definition of “conservation and management” stresses the need
to avoid “irreversible or long-term adverse effects on fishery resources and
100. Id. at 294.
101. Id.
102. See Klass, supra note 66, at 728 (“as the modern common law public trust doctrine has
developed . . . courts can now rely on that body of law to inform their interpretations of state
constitutional law and statutory law.”).
103. 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(1), (8) (2012).
104. Id. § 1851(a)(1). See also N. Carolina Fisheries Ass'n, Inc. v. Daley, 16 F. Supp. 2d 647,
655 (E.D. Va. 1997) (“optimum yield is measured on a continuing basis, therefore ‘management
measures must aim to achieve, on a continuing basis, the optimum yield from each fishery, not the
optimum yield in a single year.’”(quoting J.H. Miles & Co. v. Brown, 910 F. Supp. 1138 (E.D. Va.
1995))). See also 50 C.F.R. § 602.11(d)(1) (1995) (optimum yield is based on maximum sustainable
yield, which is defined as the “largest average annual catch or yield that can be taken over a significant
period of time from each stock under prevailing ecological and environmental conditions.”). NMFS
has stated that Alaska’s fishery management strategy, formulated according to the state’s public trust
doctrine, is consistent with the MSA, implying that the MSA and the public trust doctrine are not
inconsistent. Fisheries of the Exclusive Economic Zone Off Alaska; Pacific Salmon, 77 Fed. Reg.
75570 (Dec. 21, 2012) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 679) [hereinafter Pacific Salmon] (“as codified
in the Alaska constitution, laws, regulation, and policies, [Alaska’s fishery management strategy] is
consistent with the Magnuson-Stevens Act’s national standards.”).
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the marine environment.”105 Relying on a similarly forward-looking
statutory provision, the federal district court for Northern District of
California imposed statutory trust duties on the Secretary of the Interior,
even though doing so required the Secretary to seek additional funding
from Congress and enter into negotiations with private parties.106 In
contrast, if a court were to impose trust duties on a fishery management
council, the council could fulfill those obligations by merely amending its
own FMPs to provide better protection of fishery resources for future
generations. Because this remedy would be far less burdensome than
negotiating with private landowners or petitioning Congress for funding—
as required in the Redwood National Park case—courts should not be
reluctant to enforce the MSA’s public trust obligations.
There are two important implications to the assertion that the MSA’s
national standards create public trust duties. First, the trust duties imposed
by the statute provide NMFS with a justification for rejecting NPFMC
management measures that fail to protect the future health of the overall
marine environment. FMPs are largely developed by the fishery
management councils, and NMFS does not have the authority to institute
whatever management policies it would like.107 But, the agency could
encourage the NPFMC to reconsider the implications of the MSA’s
national standards by requiring management strategies to involve forwardlooking public trust considerations. Further, although the NPFMC is
largely comprised of industry representatives, and it is likely that the
majority of council members may be uninterested in management
decisions with no immediate economic benefits,108 the public trust doctrine
provides any interested council member with a legitimate basis for raising
concerns over the long-term sustainability of current management
practices. Second, environmental plaintiffs or states concerned with
federal management of the EEZ can challenge fishery management
decisions by alleging a violation of the public trust doctrine if, for
example, a stock is overfished and the future viability of a fishery is
uncertain. Currently, fishery management decisions are challenged under
the APA, and courts are inclined to defer to agency decisions so long as

105. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1802(5). See also PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, supra note 83, at 36 (arguing
that the definition of “conservation and management” provides fishery managers with the authority to
employ an ecosystem-based management approach).
106. Sierra Club v. Dep't of Interior, 398 F. Supp. 284, 294 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
107. Bonnie McCay et al., You Win Some, You Lose Some: The Costs and Benefits of Litigation
in Fishery Management, 7 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 5, 24 (2001) (“NMFS cannot just do whatever they
want to do. They have to work through third parties, the fishery management councils.”).
108. See, e.g., Van Tuyn, supra note 31.
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they are reasonable.109 Alternatively, if a plaintiff brought a claim alleging
damage to the public trust—as did the Sierra Club in the Redwood
National Park case—a court would not have to accord agency actions the
same degree of deference.110 As Professor Lum has stated, this is “because
breach of trust claims do not require the courts to defer to agency
decisions, as would be the norm in an administrative procedure act
appeal,” so courts are “less constrained to adopt the agency’s point of
view.”111 By curtailing deference to NMFS, the public trust doctrine might
provide a new, independent means of challenging fishing activity that
negatively impacts the future health of marine ecosystems—a more
efficient alternative to current challenges being made on a species by
species basis and only in response to federal agency actions.
V. THE ALASKAN PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IN THE EEZ
The MSA allows fishery management councils to delegate
management authority to the states in certain situations, as discussed
further below.112 When a council chooses to delegate authority to a state
that manages fisheries subject to the public trust doctrine, as in the case of
Alaska, the doctrine necessarily applies to EEZ fishery management,
regardless of whether there is a federal public trust. This section examines
the authority of fishery management councils to delegate or defer fishery
management to a state, and then considers three EEZ fisheries in which
the NPFMC has delegated or deferred management authority to the State
of Alaska: Tanner crab, rockfish, and salmon. In each of these fisheries,
the State of Alaska has considerable discretion in its management
decisions, so long as it does not take actions inconsistent with federal
regulations.113 Often, the areas under state management are subject to
stricter regulation than those under federal control, 114 a fact at least
109. Turnipseed et al., supra note 14, at 57. See also McCay et al., supra note 107, at 24
(“Magnuson-Stevens Act is set up in a way that is very difficult to attack. The amount of discretion
that is vested in the agency is enormous.”).
110. Arnold L. Lum, How Goes the Public Trust Doctrine: Is the Common Law Shaping
Environmental Policy?, 18 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 73, 74-75 (2003).
111. Id. at 75.
112. See infra Part V.A.
113. NPFMC, FISHERY MANAGEMENT PLAN FOR BERING SEA/ALEUTIAN ISLANDS KING AND
TANNER CRABS 7 (2011) [hereinafter Crab FMP], available at http://www.npfmc.org/wpcontent/PDFdocuments/fmp/CrabFMPOct11.pdf. The fisheries in the EEZ off Alaska are also subject
to international treaty agreements in some instances. See Salmon FMP, supra note 24, at ii. Whether
Alaska’s public trust doctrine applies in a fishery subject to a treaty is an open question beyond the
scope of this article.
114. NPFMC, FISHERY MANAGEMENT PLAN FOR GROUNDFISH OF THE GULF OF ALASKA 55
(2013) [hereinafter Rockfish FMP], available at http://www.npfmc.org/wp-content/PDFdocuments
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partially attributable to Alaska’s public trust doctrine, which requires a
greater focus on the long-term health of fisheries than does the MSA.115
NMFS has already indicated that Alaska’s management strategy is
consistent with the MSA, including the state’s constitutional obligation to
act as trustee over fishery resources,116 so nothing in the MSA restricts the
NPFMC from adopting the same trust principles as the State of Alaska.
The NPFMC should therefore incorporate trust principles into the
management of other fisheries under its jurisdiction to maintain a
consistent management approach throughout the region.117
A. The Delegation of Fishery Management Authority to States
Although the MSA states that the U.S. has “exclusive fishery
management authority over all fish . . . within the [EEZ],”118 the statute
also describes two situations in which a state can regulate fishing vessels
in the EEZ: (1) if the fishing vessel is registered under the law of that state,
and there is either no FMP in place for the relevant fishery or the state’s
regulations are consistent with the FMP; or (2) if the FMP for the fishery
in which a vessel is operating delegates management authority to a state.119
NMFS contends that these two provisions allow fishery management
councils to either defer or delegate management authority to a state when
a council deems such action appropriate.120 In a recent challenge to that
interpretation of the MSA, the United Cook Inlet Drift Association
/fmp/GOA/GOAfmp613.pdf (“Such State regulations are in addition to and stricter than Federal
regulations”).
115. Compare ALASKA CONST. art. VIII § 4 (“Fish, forests, wildlife, grasslands, and all other
replenishable resources belonging to the State shall be utilized, developed, and maintained on the
sustained yield principle) with 16 U.S.C. 1851(a)(1) (“Conservation and management measures shall
prevent overfishing while achieving, on a continuing basis, the optimum yield from each fishery”).
The state focus on sustained yield principles, as opposed to a mandate that fisheries achieve optimum
yield each year, provides a more flexible means of effectuating in-season closures and considering
long-term effects of fishing. See Native Vill. of Elim v. State, 990 P.2d 1, 8 (Alaska 1999) (In applying
the “sustained yield” clause, the Alaska Board of Fisheries “adopted a number of concrete measures
designed to sustain the salmon runs when evidence indicated that they were in decline: closing and/or
severely restricting the commercial, sport, and subsistence fisheries; modifying the fishing season; and
imposing chum caps, a permit system, and restrictive gear requirements.”).
116. Pacific Salmon, supra note 104, at 75575 (“current management, as codified in the Alaska
constitution, laws, regulations, and policies, is consistent with the Magnuson-Stevens Act’s national
standards.”).
117. This may even be mandated by national standard 3, which provides that “[t]o the extent
practicable, an individual stock of fish shall be managed as a unit throughout its range, and interrelated
stocks of fish shall be managed as a unit or in close coordination.” 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(3) (2012).
118. Id. § 1811(a).
119. Id. § 1856(a)(3)(A)–(B).
120. United Cook Inlet Drift Ass’n v. National Marine Fisheries Service (UCIDA), 3:13-cv00104-TMB, 17 (D. Alaska 2014) (on file with author).
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(UCIDA), a group of commercial fishermen, claimed that NMFS
improperly removed three salmon fisheries from the applicable FMP,
thereby deferring management to the State of Alaska.121 The federal
district court for the District of Alaska upheld the NMFS decision as a
reasonable interpretation of the MSA, noting that the statute clearly
contemplated state regulation in the absence of a federal management
plan.122
The UCIDA court, the first to consider state management in the EEZ,
indicated that not every fishery requires federal management throughout
the EEZ. The court stated that the MSA “sought to ensure that states
maintained an active role in fisheries management.”123 Delegating or
deferring management authority to the states for a migratory species can,
according to the court, give effect to national standard 3, which requires
stocks to be managed as a unit throughout their range to the extent
practicable.124 Because the authority of the fishery management councils
to defer management to the states by revoking an FMP (as opposed to
specifically delegating authority in an FMP) is ambiguous, NMFS’s
interpretation of the MSA on this issue was, according to the court, entitled
to deference.125 The implications of NMFS’s ability to defer or delegate
management authority to the State of Alaska are explored below.126
However, it is clear that even if there is no federal public trust doctrine in
the EEZ—which is far from certain—127 when the fragmented nature of
the MSA creates state-regulated pockets in the EEZ, managing states will
apply their public trust principles to the EEZ. The regionalized fishery
management system can therefore produce conservation benefits under the
right circumstances as, where it applies, the public trust doctrine requires
state fishery managers to consider the long-term impacts of fishery
management decisions on entire marine ecosystems, rather than focusing
on a single target species in each management plan.128

121. Id. at 7.
122. Id. at 20.
123. Id. at 19.
124. 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(3) (2012).
125. UCIDA v. NMFS, at 28. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 843 (1984) (“if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question
for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute”).
126. See infra Part V.B.
127. See supra Part IV (discussing the trust duties Congress imposed through the MSA’s national
standards).
128. See, e.g., Kathryn J. Mengerink, The Pew Oceans Commission Report: Navigating A Route
to Sustainable Seas, 31 ECOLOGY L.Q. 689, 699 (2004) (explaining “fishery management plans are
criticized because they manage single species rather than ecosystems. Problems attributed to single-
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B. EEZ Fisheries Managed by Alaska
Alaska currently has management authority over several EEZ
fisheries, and thus the state’s public trust doctrine is already relevant to
fishery management in portions of the EEZ. In 1987, NMFS repealed the
FMP for the Tanner crab fishery in the Gulf of Alaska because the FMP
failed to coordinate federal management efforts with the State of
Alaska.129 NMFS determined that the FMP had not provided adequate
flexibility in managing the crab fishery, as the plan did not allow the
federal government to make in-season adjustments—such as adopting
state harvest guidelines or recommended closures—that were at times
necessary to ensure the conservation and protection of the stock.130 There
is currently no FMP for the Tanner crab fishery in the Gulf of Alaska, so
management is deferred to the State of Alaska with no federal
involvement.131 Alaska’s constitutional public trust obligations therefore
play a huge role in ensuring the continued stability of one of the most
commercially important fisheries in the region. Further, when NMFS
developed a new FMP for crab in the Bering Sea, approved in 1989, it
sought to avoid the inflexibility of the previous FMP by delegating certain
management measures to the State of Alaska, though, in this case, subject
to federal oversight.132 The primary objective of the current Bering Sea
Tanner crab FMP is to “[e]nsure the long-term reproductive viability of
king and Tanner crab populations.”133 This goal is consistent with Alaska’s
public trust doctrine because it emphasizes the importance of maintaining
the health of the fishery for future generations. When the crab FMP is
considered in context—as part of a plan delegating management authority
to a state with strong public trust traditions—it likely represents the first
instance of a federal action creating public trust obligations in the EEZ,

species management include lack of consideration of significant ecosystem effects of commercial
fishing such as habitat destruction and bycatch.”).
129. Tanner Crab off Alaska, 52 Fed. Reg. 17577, 17578 (May 11, 1987) (to be codified at 50
C.F.R. pt. 671); 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(3) (2012) (the FMP’s failure to coordinate management with the
state was a violation of national standard 3, which requires stocks to be managed as a unit throughout
their range to the extent practicable).
130. Id.
131. See, Species, Tanner Crab Management, ALASKA DEP’T OF FISH AND GAME,
http://www.adfg.alaska.gov/index.cfm?adfg=tannercrab.management (last visited Spring 2015) (“The
Alaska State Constitution establishes, as state policy, the development and use of replenishable
resources, in accordance with the principle of sustained yield, for the maximum benefit of the people
of the state.”).
132. Crab FMP, supra note 113, at 7.
133. Id. at 1.
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because Alaska is still bound by its constitutionally-mandated public trust
duties even when acting with delegated authority from NMFS.134
In an action similar to the repeal of the crab FMP, in 1998, NMFS
removed black and blue rockfish from the FMP for groundfish in the Gulf
of Alaska.135 The purpose of this action was to prevent localized
overfishing by allowing the state to implement harvest guidelines based
on smaller geographic areas— a measure that was not possible under
federal regulations.136 Federal management had relied on sampling data
from a pelagic trawl fishery and set high overall catch limits for rockfish,
creating essentially unrestricted harvests of nearshore rockfish.137 By
allowing the state to set catch limits based on its own sampling data,
NMFS’s final rule noted that removing the two species of rockfish from
the FMP “should result in more effective conservation measures in both
nearshore and offshore areas.”138 In addition, an environmental assessment
concluded that, even though the fisheries might undergo short-term
restrictions, the “[l]ong term economic effects . . . should be beneficial as
stocks of black rockfish would be sustained under more direct
management.”139 All of these findings are consistent with the notion that
state management, pursuant to Alaska’s public trust doctrine, will
necessarily involve planning for the long-term conservation of a species
to ensure continued public access to the fishery.
NMFS has also delegated Alaska the authority to regulate stateregistered vessels fishing in the eastern section of the demersal shelf
rockfish fishery,140 allowing for increased coordination between state and
federal management of the species. 141 NMFS’s coordination with Alaska
134. Id. at 2 (under the FMP, minimum sizes, catch limits, in-season adjustments, and closed
waters are all adopted under state laws, subject to an appeals process in the FMP, so Alaska will
promulgate many important regulations pursuant to state law and these management decisions will all
be burdened by the state public trust doctrine); see also Tanner Crab off Alaska, supra note 129
(NMFS has recognized that the state’s management policies provide the flexibility to effectuate inseason fishery closures due to the state’s emphasis on maintaining fishery productivity for future
generations, consistent with Alaska’s public trust duties).
135. Management Authority for Black and Blue Rockfish, 63 Fed. Reg. 11167 (March 6, 1998)
(to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 679).
136. Id.
137. NPFMC, ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT OF AMENDMENT 46 TO THE FISHERY
MANAGEMENT PLAN FOR GROUNDFISH OF THE GULF OF ALASKA 2 (Jan. 1998), available at
http://alaskafisheries.noaa.gov/analyses/groundfish/EA_Amendment_46_GOA_Jan_1997.pdf.
138. Management Authority for Black and Blue Rockfish, supra note 135, at 11168.
139. ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT OF AMENDMENT 46, supra note 130, at 20.
140. Rockfish FMP, supra note 114, at 55.
141. Id. at 57 (“the Regional Administrator must coordinate inseason adjustments, when
appropriate, with the State of Alaska to assure uniformity of management in both State and Federal
waters.”).
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will necessarily involve public trust considerations, as trust principles are
inherent to any state management strategy. That is, because the Alaskan
public trust doctrine finds authority in the Alaska Constitution and clearly
applies to the management of fishery resources,142 regardless of whether
such management is in coordination with the federal government, state
fishery managers must provide for the sustained yield of fisheries and
consider the effects of fishing on future generations.143
Most recently, NMFS amended the FMP for salmon fisheries in the
EEZ off Alaska to remove three historical net fisheries from the western
area of the Gulf of Alaska, thereby entirely deferring management of those
fisheries to the state.144 The amendment also reaffirmed Alaska’s
management authority over the entire eastern area of the Gulf.145 This
amendment led to the litigation discussed above, in which the United Cook
Inlet Drift Association unsuccessfully challenged NMFS’s authority to
defer management to the State of Alaska.146 Under the current FMP, all
commercial salmon fishing in the western Gulf of Alaska is now managed
by the State of Alaska, with the federal government retaining management
authority only over areas closed to commercial fishing.147 NMFS
determined that the State of Alaska’s escapement-based system of salmon
management— which monitors the estimated size of spawning stock in
key rivers, streams, or watersheds, and allows for in-season adjustments
to harvest limits— was superior to the MSA’s rigid annual catch limits.148
Escapement-based management is more effective at preventing
overfishing of salmon than the pre-season predictions of sustainable catch
limits used in most FMPs, because the state management program is
conducted in real time and provides fishery managers with in-season
142. ALASKA CONST., art VIII § 3 (“Wherever occurring in their natural state, fish, wildlife, and
waters are reserved to the people for their common use.”); Gilbert v. State, Dep’t of Fish & Game, Bd.
of Fisheries, 803 P.2d 391, 398-99 (Alaska 1990) (“The state has an obligation to manage fish and
game resources to the benefit of all in accord with its public trust duties.”).
143. ALASKA CONST., art VIII § 4 (“Fish . . . and all other replenishable resources belonging to
the state shall be utilized, developed, and maintained on the sustained yield principle.”) (emphasis
added).
144. Pacific Salmon, supra note 104.
145. Id.
146. United Cook Inlet Drift Ass’n v. National Marine Fisheries Service, No. 3:13-cv-00104TMB (D. Alaska filed Sept. 5, 2014).
147. See Salmon FMP, supra note 24, at 9 (the rest of the west area was closed to net fishing by
the International Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean, so presumably
federal authority to regulate salmon fishing in this part of the EEZ would only be relevant in the event
that the international convention is amended or repealed).
148. NMFS, AMENDMENT 12: REVISIONS TO THE FISHERY MANAGEMENT PLAN FOR THE
SALMON FISHERIES IN THE EEZ OFF THE COAST OF ALASKA 55 (2012), available at
http://www.alaskafisheries.noaa.gov/sustainablefisheries/amds/default.htm.
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assessments of run strength.149 If salmon runs are lower than expected,
fishery managers can make in-season closures and ensure that minimum
escapement goals are met in order to “maximize surplus productivity of
future runs.”150 As expected, the state management strategy is willing to
sacrifice short-term economic benefits to provide for the sustained vitality
of the fishery—a management philosophy consistent with the public trust
doctrine’s emphasis on preserving resources so that they might be enjoyed
by future generations. This public trust objective, grounded in state law,151
allows state fishery managers to think beyond the current fishing season,
and stands in contrast to the goals of the NPFMC, which is dominated by
industry representatives and is thus generally concerned with immediate
economic benefits.152
Further, NMFS made a determination that the state’s management
strategy “as codified in the Alaska constitution, laws, regulation, and
policies, is consistent with the Magnuson-Stevens Act’s national
standards.”153 This statement is arguably the first time NMFS has
acknowledged that Alaska’s laws, including its constitutional provisions
concerning the state’s public trust doctrine, are consistent with federal
fishery management laws. Such an assertion indicates that the NPFMC
should consider trust principles even in federally managed EEZ fisheries,
as the MSA is not inconsistent with the Alaskan public trust doctrine. The
NPFMC should be especially willing to consider trust principles when it
is necessary to coordinate management efforts with the State of Alaska
regarding migratory species, as such considerations would encourage
management strategies that focus less on a single fishing season and more
on the need to conserve marine resources, including non-target species, to
ensure that fisheries remain productive for years to come.
C. Expansion of the Public Trust to Other Fisheries
In each of the examples discussed above, NMFS either repealed an
FMP or removed a species from an FMP in order to allow the State of
Alaska to take a more direct management role in a fishery. Each NMFS
decision was marked by agency assertions that the FMP amendment would
result in conservation benefits to the affected species, implicitly

149. Salmon FMP, supra note 24, at 26.
150. Id.
151. See ALASKA CONST., art VIII §§ 3, 4.
152. See Van Tuyn, supra note 31, at 666 (discussing “the unique decision-making structure of
fishery management in the United States—where industry-dominated ‘regional fishery management
councils’ are empowered to craft regulations for their own industry.”).
153. Pacific Salmon, supra note 104, at 75575.
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acknowledging the emphasis on sustainability that characterizes Alaska’s
fishery management laws.154 Further, NMFS seems to recognize the
importance of coordinating fishery management with the State of Alaska,
a goal that is consistent with national standard 3,155 and which elevates the
importance of Alaska’s fishery management policies by providing the
state with more autonomy over EEZ fishery management. It seems likely
that anytime a migratory species is at risk of being overfished, and the
species is important to both the State of Alaska and the federal
government, the NPFMC will work to accommodate any differences in
fishery management policies by coordinating management with the state,
as evidenced by the examples of Tanner crab, rockfish, and salmon in the
EEZ off Alaska. The public trust doctrine will thus continue to be relevant
with regard to migratory species of fish, even if the NPFMC does not adopt
public trust principles in other FMPs. The State of Alaska’s management
objectives reflect a public trust concern for future generations, and this
concern will have to factor into any federal efforts to coordinate
management with the state. Incorporating Alaska’s public trust doctrine
into the management of migratory species also provides environmental
plaintiffs with an important means of challenging fishery management
decisions. If FMPs include public trust obligations, then a plaintiff can
allege damage to the trust corpus whenever a fishing regulation
jeopardizes the future of the fishery, even if that regulation might be
reasonable under the MSA.
VI. CONCLUSION
The public trust doctrine is adrift in federal waters, waiting to be
employed. It has already been incorporated into the management of EEZ
fisheries in which the NPFMC has delegated or deferred management
authority to the State of Alaska, because the state’s fishery management
policy is always burdened by the public trust doctrine.156 There is no longer
any doubt that the public trust doctrine is consistent with the MSA and
federal management of the EEZ, as NMFS concluded that Alaska’s fishery
management strategies, which reflect broad public trust concerns, are
consistent with all applicable federal laws.157 Further, state management

154. See Salmon FMP, supra note 24; Rockfish FMP, supra note 114; Crab FMP, supra note
113.
155. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1851(a)(3) (2012) (National standard 3 provides that “[t]o the extent
practicable, an individual stock of fish shall be managed as a unit throughout its range, and interrelated
stocks of fish shall be managed as a unit or in close coordination.”).
156. See supra Part V.B.
157. Id.
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of certain EEZ fisheries subject to the state’s public trust principles is only
possible in a regionalized fishery management system. Therefore, even in
the absence of recognized federal public trust duties in the EEZ, deferring
management of highly migratory stocks to the states provides a means of
injecting the public trust doctrine into EEZ fishery management.158
However, the NPFMC and environmental plaintiffs should work to
incorporate public trust principles into all federally managed fisheries for
two reasons. First, in order to prevent inconsistent management of
migratory stocks under NPFMC jurisdiction, as required by national
standard 3,159 the public trust doctrine should apply to all fisheries in the
EEZ that are important to both the federal government and the State of
Alaska. Second, the MSA contains trust principles in its national
standards,160 and fishery managers and environmental plaintiffs should be
willing to invoke the public trust doctrine to encourage or defend
management strategies that promote conservation of the entire marine
ecosystem. If management efforts continue to focus on harvesting
commercially valuable fish, the habitat essential to the survival of those
fish, as well as living marine resources with less commercial value, will
remain largely unregulated and thus unprotected.161 The destruction of
these marine resources might deprive future generations of their
usufructuary right of fishery, in violation of both the public trust doctrine
and the MSA. The MSA requires that fishery management measures
produce optimum yields “on a continuing basis,”162 reflecting a public
trust concern for posterity, and sustained production requires a healthy
ocean to support commercially viable fish populations.163 The public trust
doctrine provides fishery managers with a means of correcting
management oversights within the framework of existing regulations, and
allows environmental plaintiffs to challenge commercial fishing activity
that threatens the long-term health of fisheries in a manner inconsistent

158. See supra Part V.A.
159. 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(3) (2012).
160. See supra Part IV.B.
161. See 16 U.S.C. 1853(a)(7) (2011) (although the MSA supposedly requires FMPs to designate
“essential fish habitat” and “minimize to the extent practicable adverse effects on such habitat caused
by fishing,” this provision has not led to much actual habitat protection); See Van Tuyn, supra note
29, at 670 (“In the North Pacific, NMFS focused almost exclusively on the designation and description
of EFH, while deferring detailed consideration of the impacts of fishing on habitat—as well as
measures to mitigate those impacts—until some undetermined second stage . . . ”).
162. 16 U.S.C. 1851(a)(1) (2012).
163. See Johnson, supra note 26 (“Regardless of where the right of fishery is recognized, it is
meaningless unless fish are there to be caught. If the water is polluted, the fish die. Thus the right of
fishery necessarily includes an implied right to water quality sufficient to support the fishery.”).
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with the MSA’s national standards. All that is left is for the relevant actors
in fishery management to seize and apply the doctrine.

